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Abstract
We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and
Ferejohn (1989). We ﬁrst show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by
Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of
stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such equilibria are ei-
ther of the three-group or four-group type. The latter type tends to occur when
the size of the legislature becomes larger. Moreover, four-group equilibria imply
large delay costs.
Keywords: Baron/Ferejohn model, bargaining in legislatures, open rules, three-
group and four-group equilibria
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Collective decision rules are often applied in distributing resources among individuals in
a society. In order to achieve eﬃciency and fairness, various collective choice processes
with endogenous agenda setting have been proposed.1 In an important and inﬂuential
paper, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) (henceforth BF) propose a model of legislative bar-
gaining with an endogenous agenda setting. A body of legislators, each representing
the voters of their district, decide about how to distribute some beneﬁts. With an
open amendment rule, the proposed allocation is either seconded or amended prior to
vote. In the former case, it is voted up or down. In the latter case, there is a ‘run-oﬀ’
election between the original proposal and the amendment. The winner becomes the
standing proposal in the next round.
BF characterize the stationary equilibria when the process repeats itself until an allo-
cation is seconded and receives a majority of the votes. They show that a three-group
equilibrium occurs. The agenda-setter proposes that the cake be distributed between
himself and a subset of voters (second group) that form a majority of voters. The third
group contains the remaining individuals who do not receive anything. Those members
who obtain resources will move the proposal if they are recognized next. If, however,
one individual in the third group is recognized, the member will oﬀer an amendment
chosen in such a way as to defeat the motion on the ﬂoor, and the legislature will move
to the next period. Hence the initial proposal is not necessarily accepted in the ﬁrst
session, which implies a costly delay.
BF assume that the agenda-setter does not diﬀerentiate between individuals who will
move his proposal if recognized next (and vote for it against status quo) and those who
will not second his proposal if recognized next but will vote for the proposal if it is
pitted against the status quo. We will analyze this problem and answer the question
what happens, if the agenda-setter distinguishes between these two groups and thus
forms a proposal consisting of four groups.
In addition, we show in this paper that the agenda-setter may want to oﬀer four-group
proposals, so BF’s three-group equilibrium does not always hold in such circumstances.
1Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Harrington (1986), Harrington (1990), Banks and Gasmi (1987),
Ferejohn, Fiorina, and McKelvey (1987), Epple and Riordan (1987).
2We give a complete characterization of the set of stationary equilibria for simple and
super majority rules. Such equilibria are either of the three-group or four-group type.
We identify sets of parameters where three-group or four-group equilibria occur. As a
rule, four-group equilibria obtain if the size of legislature is larger.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we outline the legislative process.
In section three we identify the types of stationary equilibria. In section four we provide
the general theorem that characterizes stationary equilibria and discuss the relationship
to BF. In the ﬁfth section, we identify numerically the parameter constellations where
three-group or four-group equilibria occur. Section six concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Problem
We consider the problem of a group of N individuals (legislators) distributing one unit
of beneﬁts (N odd and N > 1) amongst themselves. Individuals are indexed by i, j,






where xit is the share of the cake individual i receives in period t. Since the cake can
only be distributed once, xit can only be positive for one period at most.2 The discount
factor δ is assumed to be identical across individuals. The distribution of the cake is
governed by a collective choice process containing a voting rule and by a recognition
rule that determines which individual can make a proposal. Of course, an allocation
is Pareto-eﬃcient if and only if the whole cake is distributed in the ﬁrst period, i.e. in
t = 0.
2Theoretically, it would be possible to distribute the cake partially over many periods. But this is
weakly dominated for proposal-makers, so this possibility is neglected in our analysis.
32.2 The Amendment Process and Open Rules
We examine the legislative process with open rules introduced by Baron and Ferejohn
(1989). With an open rule the ﬂoor is subject to an amendment. Under an open rule,
a member who is in a position to make a proposal or an amendment has to take into
account the fact that his proposal will be pitted against another proposal. The entire
collective choice process under an open rule is given by
Period t=0
(i) The ﬁrst agenda-setter A is recognized by fair randomization and sets a proposal
xA = (x1
A,...xN
A). This proposal is called the motion on the ﬂoor.
(ii) The second agenda-setter B is recognized randomly. He can move the proposal
xA to a vote against the status quo, or he makes an amendment xB.
(iii) Voting takes place either between xA and status quo or between xA and xB. If
there is a vote between the status quo and a proposal, then an α-majority rule
is applied (for a given α ∈ [0.5, 1]). If there is a vote between two proposals, the
proposal that receives most of the votes is accepted and the game moves to the
next period.
(iv) If xA competes against the status quo and is voted up, the beneﬁts are distributed.
If xA is voted down, the game moves to the next period.
Period t=1
(v) Depreciation of the cake with discount factor δ.
(vi) If xA has lost against the status quo in the previous period, the game continues
with (i), i.e. with recognition of a ﬁrst agenda-setter.
(vii) If xA has been pitted against xB, the winner will get the same status as proposal
xA in period t=0, i.e. the winner becomes the motion on the ﬂoor. The game
continues with (ii), i.e. with recognition of an amendment-setter.
Note that the game ends if and only if a proposal is moved and wins a majority against
the status quo.
4Like BF, we simplify the analysis by the following tie-breaking rule: If an individual is
indiﬀerent between two proposals he will vote for the one proposed last.3
2.3 Equilibrium Concept
We adopt the concept of stationary equilibria introduced by BF. The idea is that an
individual will act the same way if he is in the same situation. To capture the notion of
stationary equilibria, BF introduce structurally equivalent subgames deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition
Two subgames are structurally equivalent if
1. the extant agendas at the initial nodes of the subgames are identical;
2. the sets of individuals who may be recognized next are the same;
3. the strategy sets of individuals are the same.
An equilibrium is said to be stationary if the continuation values are the same for each
structurally equivalent subgame. A consequence of this deﬁnition is that the strategies
are stationary in a stationary equilibrium. Stationary strategies are necessarily history-
independent, and members are assumed to believe that moves oﬀ the equilibrium path
are accidents that will not reoccur in future play. As observed by BF, in any stationary
equilibrium the second proposal is a permutation of the ﬁrst proposal. The reason is as
follows: Any legislator recognized as second agenda-setter will only propose a distribu-
tion of the cake if this proposal wins against the proposal on the ﬂoor. After winning
the ballot against the ﬁrst proposal, the second agenda-setter faces the same situation
as the prior agenda-setter. Therefore, in a stationary equilibrium the amendment will
be a permutation of the ﬁrst proposal as a suitable amendment will win against the
proposal on the ﬂoor because of our tie-breaking rule and the ﬁrst proposal generates
the maximal expected payoﬀ for an agenda setter.
3Note that abstention is a weakly dominated strategy since in the case of indiﬀerence there is no
gain from abstention. We can therefore neglect abstention.
53 Stationary Equilibria
3.1 Observations
In this section, we identify the types of stationary equilibria. We start with some
simple observations that motivate the construction of the equilibria. A member who
has gained initial recognition for making a proposal takes into account the fact that his
proposal must be suﬃciently attractive to a subset of members to be seconded if one of
those members is recognized for making an amendment. The amount of beneﬁts that
the initial agenda-setter must oﬀer other members so that his proposal will be moved
is denoted by M. Furthermore, he has to garantuee that in a ballot against status
quo a majority votes for his proposal. BF state that the agenda-setter oﬀers M to
m ≥ N−1
2 individuals if the simple majority rule is applied. The number m determines
the probability of a proposal being moved and therefore accepted.
We examine α-majority rules (1
2 ≤ α ≤ 1) and allow that the equilibrium number
m of individuals receiving M could be smaller than αN − 1 and in particular smaller
than N−1
2 . A fourth group may arise, consisting of individuals who are oﬀered a certain
amount called T, so that they do not move the proposal when recognized next but vote
for a proposal against the status quo. In that case, the group with members obtaining
T forms an α-majority with the group that obtains M and the agenda-setter. We
summarize this observation in the following proposition.
Proposition 1
An optimal proposal structure is characterized by
• A subset of size m obtains M which is deﬁned as the minimal amount such that
these individuals will move the proposal when recognized next.
• A subset of size max{αN −1−m, 0} obtains T which is deﬁned as the minimal
amount such that an individual will vote for a proposal against status quo.
• A subset of size min{N − αN, N − m − 1} obtains.
• The agenda-setter gets the leftover: 1 − mM − max{αN − 1 − m, 0}T.
6We will later characterize precisely the values M, T and m. Two simple observations
help to sharpen the intuition. First, an individual when recognized as second agenda-
setter has - one period later - the same power as the ﬁrst agenda-setter (if he oﬀers
an amendment). Therefore, M has to be the discounted continuation value of the
agenda-setter.
Second, if a ballot against status quo occurs, all individuals are equal regarding future
periods as no agenda-setter for the next period is determined. Hence, T will correspond
to the ex ante continuation value of all individuals before any further recognition.
Note that two diﬀerent types of equilibria can occur.
Three-group equilibrium
• The agenda-setter obtains xa = 1 − mM.
• m individuals obtain M with m ≥ αN − 1.
• N − 1 − m members receive zero.
Four-group equilibrium
• The agenda-setter obtains xa = 1 − mM − (αN − 1 − m)T.
• m individuals obtain M with 0 < m < αN − 1.
• αN − 1 − m members obtain T.
• (1 − α)N members receive zero.
The intuition for the existence of four-group equilibria runs as follows: The agenda-
setter faces the following trade-oﬀs: He must make a proposal suﬃciently attractive
to a subset of members such that these individuals will move the proposal if they are
recognized next. The larger the subset of such members is, the more expensive it is,
and the smaller is the share of the agenda-setter. The agenda-setter simultaneously
has to ensure that there are enough votes if a proposal is voted up or down. For the
latter purpose, a smaller amount of beneﬁts is needed as these individuals do not count
with the value of being recognized. Hence, it may be optimal for the agenda-setter to
create four groups in his proposal.
73.2 Amendment Choice
We next examine the determination of an amendment. As stated in the last section,
in equilibrium, any amendment will be a permutation of the proposal on the ﬂoor. We
ﬁrst discuss which type of permutation will win against a prior proposal characterized
by Proposition 1. In the case where m > N−1
2 , any permutation wins the ballot. Every
individual who receives at least M under an amendment (except the ﬁrst agenda-setter)
and the amendment-setter will vote for it. If m ≤ N−1
2 , the amendment-setter cannot
choose any permutation to win against the ﬁrst proposal. It is not necessarily ensured
that N+1
2 individuals obtain at least as much as under the proposal on the ﬂoor. This
is illustrated by the following example.
Example: Suppose that a legislature consisting of N = 11 individuals uses an α-
majority rule with α = 0.75, i.e. a majority of 9 individuals is required to adopt a
proposal. We consider a ﬁrst proposal and an amendment that is a permutation of the
ﬁrst proposal. The proposals are illustrated in the following table.




































xa denotes the share of the agenda-setter, i.e. we assume that individual 1 is the ﬁrst
agenda-setter and individual 11 is recognized as second agenda-setter. Furthermore,
we assume that m = 4 < N−1
2 = 5 individuals obtain M (individuals 2 to 5). Hence, a
group of 4 = αN − m − 1 individuals (individuals 6 to 9) is oﬀered T under the ﬁrst
proposal. We will show later that 0 < T < M < xa which is assumed here. Hence, the
amendment-setter and all individuals who obtain M under the amendment vote for it,
i.e. m + 1 = 5 = N−1
2 . All other individuals vote for the ﬁrst proposal. Therefore, this
amendment would not win.
In the following we assume that the second agenda-setter chooses the amendment in
the spirit of the priority (or tie-breaking) rule of BF. This allows us to compare our
results with BF and replicate their result. The priority rule is part of Proposition 2
and Proposition 3. We will discuss the signiﬁcance of the priority rules and the work
8of Primo (2007) on this issue in section 4.4.
Since the equilibrium strategies diﬀer depending on whether m ≥ N−1
2 or m < N−1
2 ,
we diﬀerentiate between these two cases. First, we provide the equilibrium in the case
where m ≥ N−1
2 . The special case α = 1
2 and m ≥ N−1
2 is the BF result.
3.3 The Case m ≥ N−1
2
Proposition 2
Suppose that a society uses the α-majority rule (α ∈ [0.5,1]) and a random recognition
rule within an open rule amendment process. The number m of individuals who receive
enough to move a proposal is exogenously restricted to m ≥ N−1
2 . Then a stationary
equilibrium exists and is given by the following:
• The individual recognized ﬁrst makes a proposal x: M to m members (where
N − 1 ≥ m ≥ N−1
2 ), T to max{αN − 1 − m,0} other members, xa = 1 − mM −
max{αN − 1 − m,0}T to himself, and 0 to the rest.
• If the member recognized next is one of those m individuals, he moves the previous
proposal. The proposal x is accepted with a majority of max{m + 1,αN} votes.
• If the member recognized next is one of the N − 1 − m individuals, he makes
a proposal that is a permutation of x: xa to himself, M to m other members,
excluding the ﬁrst agenda-setter and including all individuals who would have
received zero or T in the ﬁrst proposal. The other individuals who obtain M or
T in this proposal are chosen randomly among the m members who were oﬀered
M in the initial proposal. This amendment defeats the prior proposal.
• An individual will vote for a proposal (against the status quo) if he receives at
least T.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the appendix. The equilibrium proposal is
uniquely determined by m that depends (uniquely) on the discount factor δ, the re-
quired size of majority α and the size of the legislature N. In the following, we denote
the equilibrium strategies in Proposition 2 by index L indicating the “large” m. The
proposal is denoted by xL, the strategies are called L-strategies.
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h = max{αN − 1 − m,0}
T =
mδ
N((1 − δ)(N − 1) + mδ)
(1)
V m
a (xL) denotes the expected value of the individual recognized ﬁrst if he oﬀers the
equilibrial proposal xL.
In the next section we examine the case where m has to be smaller than N−1
2 .
3.4 The Case m < N−1
2
In this section we derive an equilibrium for the same situation as in section 3.3, but we
assume exogenously that m has to be smaller than N−1
2 . An immediate result is that
only four-group equilibria can occur.
Proposition 3
Suppose a society of N individuals using the α-majority rule with α ≥ 1
2 in an open rule
amendment process. The number m of individuals who are oﬀered enough to move the
proposal is exogenously restricted to m < N−1
2 . Then a stationary equilibrium exists
and is given by
• The agenda-setter recognized ﬁrst makes a proposal x: M to m members (where
1 ≤ m < N−1
2 ), T to αN −m−1 other members, xa = 1−mM −(αN −m−1)T
to himself, and 0 to the rest.
10• If the individual recognized next is one of the m members, he will move the
proposal to a vote against the status quo. The proposal is accepted with an
α-majority.
• If the individual recognized next is one of the members who receive T or zero in
the ﬁrst proposal, he will oﬀer an amendment that is a permutation of the ﬁrst
proposal:
xa to himself, zero to the previous agenda-setter, M to m members chosen ran-
domly from the N−2−m individuals who received T or zero in the ﬁrst proposal.
All remaining members of the group that received zero or T under the ﬁrst pro-
posal obtain T in the amendment. The individuals who received M in the ﬁrst
proposal receive zero or T, which is again chosen randomly.
• All members who receive at least T will favor the proposal if it is pitted against
status quo.
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the appendix. Again, the equilibrium in this
case is uniquely determined by m that depends on δ,α and N. In the following, we
assign this equilibrium by index S (for “small” m), e.g. the proposal will be denoted
by xS.
The proof of Proposition 3 yields


























where D1, D2 and E are given by
D1 := (1 − m
N−1)( m
N−m−2) m
N−1pk δ + (1 − m
N−m−2) m
N−1pl
D2 := ( m
N−m−2) m
N−1δ + ( m
N−m−2)(1 − m
N−1) 1
N−1 δ2 + (1 − m
N−m−2) 1
N−1 δ
E := 1 − ( m
N−m−2)(1 − m
N−1)(1 − m+1
N−1)δ2 − (1 − m
N−2−m)(1 − m+1
N−1)δ
with pk = 1 − min{
(1−α)N
m ,1} and pl = min{αN−1−m
N−2m−2,1}. Note that pk denotes the
probability of an individual who received M in the ﬁrst proposal obtaining T (instead
11of zero) under an amendment, while pl denotes the probability of an individual who
received T or zero in the ﬁrst proposal obtaining T under an amendment.
The value T is again given by equation (1). However, the values T S and T L diﬀer since
T = T(m,δ,N) and mS 6= mL. Moreover, T is increasing in m. We therefore obtain
the result that T S < T L because mS < mL.
4 The Overall Equilibrium
In the previous section we derived equilibria restricted by the assumptions that either
m ≥ N−1
2 or m < N−1
2 , using some tie-breaking rules regarding the choice of amend-
ments. We will now summarize these results to cover both cases and formulate our
main result.
4.1 The Main Result
In equilibrium, an agenda-setter will always maximize his share of the cake. He will
therefore compare the expected payoﬀs under both restrictions m ≥ N−1
2 and m < N−1
2
and choose the alternative with the higher expected value.
Theorem 1
Suppose a society with N members using the α-majority rule with α ≥ 1
2 and discount
factor δ ∈ [0,1] in an open amendment process. Then a stationary equilibrium exists
and is given by
• The agenda-setter recognized ﬁrst calculates V mL
a (xL) and V mS





a (xL) ≥ V mS
a (xS)
mS, V mL
a (xL) < V mS
a (xS)
(2)
• If m∗ = mL then all individuals play the L-strategies according to Proposition 2.
If m∗ = mS then all individuals play the S-strategies according to Proposition 3.
Henceforth we denote the compounded equilibrium proposal by x∗.
124.2 Properties of the Equilibrium
It is useful to discuss some properties of the equilibrium.
Property 1: x∗
a ≥ M∗
The property is proved by contradiction: Suppose x∗
a < M∗ = δV m∗
a (x∗). Then using





N − 1 − m









a (x∗) denotes the expected value of the agenda-setter, while V m∗
L (x∗) denotes the
expected value of an individual who receives 0 under the proposal x∗. Therefore this
is a contradiction.
Property 2: The probability that a proposal is accepted may be lower than in the BF
model.
Property 2 follows from the following consideration: The number of individuals receiv-
ing M represents the probability of a proposal being seconded and therefore accepted.
If a four-group equilibrium is formed with m∗ = mS, this probability becomes lower
than one half. The probability that a proposal will be accepted shrinks, also in t = 0.
This implies higher costly delay than in the BF model.
Property 3: Playing the S-strategies generates a less equal distribution than playing
the L-strategies.
A four-group equilibrium with m∗ = mS generates a less equal distribution. The num-
ber of individuals who receive at least something remains the same, i.e. αN, but while
mS + 1 individuals receive more in comparison with the L-strategies, the third group
consisting of αN − 1 − mS individuals obtains less.
Taking derivatives of T with respect to N, δ, or m yields the following properties:
Property 4: The amount T is decreasing in N.
A consequence of this property is that a four-group equilibrium becomes more attractive
for the agenda-setter, the larger N is. Our simulation results suggest that for all
α ∈ [0.5,1] and δ ∈ [0,1] there is a critical value ˆ N such that a four-group equilibrium
arises if N ≥ ˆ N. Furthermore, only equilibria with m∗ < N−1
2 will occur for N
suﬃciently large.
13Property 5: The amount T is increasing in δ.
Individuals are more patient if δ is large. The agenda-setter must oﬀer a higher amount
for individuals to vote for his proposal if it is pitted against status quo. Moreover, it
is straightforward to show that T ∈ [0, 1
N].
Property 6: The amount T is increasing in m.
The intuition of this result is as follows: If the probability of a proposal being moved
and therefore accepted rises, then the expected value of an individual before ﬁrst recog-
nition will rise, i.e. T will rise.
It is intuitively clear that we also have T ≤ M. Individuals who receive M support
the proposal in two ways. First, they will move the proposal if recognized to make an
amendment, and second they will vote for a proposal if it is pitted against status quo.
The amount T only covers the vote for a proposal against status quo. The agenda-setter
has to oﬀer more to an individual who is already recognized for making an amendment
than to an individual who is not recognized.
Note that equality between M and T occurs if and only if δ = 1 and α = 1, i.e. when
unanimity is required and individuals are inﬁnitely patient. In this case, the agenda-
setter recognized ﬁrst will oﬀer 1
N to everybody. This proposal is moved and accepted
in the ﬁrst period, i.e. in t = 0.
4.3 Relation to Baron-Ferejohn Model
We look at the special case α = 1
2. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) state that if the simple
majority rule is applied within an open amendment process, then every stationary
equilibrium involves the proposal x∗ = xL, i.e. m∗ ≥ N−1
2 , and all individuals play the
L-strategies. With the following proposition, which is proved in the appendix, we show
that there are parameter constellations (given by α = 0.5, δ ∈ [0,1], N ≥ 3) where
four-group equilibria occur, and, moreover, where a stationary equilibrium does not
necessarily include the L-strategies, i.e. x∗ 6= xL. This amends the theorem of BF.
14Proposition 4
Suppose α = 1
2.
(i) If m is constrained by m ≥ N−1
2 , only three-group equilibria arise.
(ii) A three-group equilibrium may not exist.
(iii) There exist four-group equilibria.
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the appendix.
As already noted, we obtain the same result as BF if we set α = 1
2 and restrict m
to m ≥ N−1
2 , as we use the same priority rule regarding the type of amendments in
equilibrium as BF. In the next section we will discuss alternative of priority rules.
4.4 Priority Rules for Amendment Choice
Our results have been derived for an amendment setting that reﬂects two considera-
tions. First, it is never optimal to bribe the ﬁrst agenda-setter to vote for the second
proposal. The price is too high. Therefore, the prior agenda-setter obtains 0 under
an amendment in equilibrium. Second, as the amendment-setter is indiﬀerent about
whom to give M, T or 0 among the remaining N− individuals as long as his proposal
wins, we have chosen a particular priority rule. This rule is in the spirit of BF and
allows us to replicate their result. Furthermore, the priority rule reﬂects an element of
’fairness’: The second agenda-setter gives M ﬁrst to individuals who have received T
or 0 under the ﬁrst proposal. Primo (2007) has observed that an amendment can follow
other randomization strategies when deciding whom to make oﬀers to and each of those
strategies can be sustained as a distinct equilibrium with slightly diﬀerent payoﬀs. Our
results can be extended in the spirit of Primo (2007) to other randomization strategies
which produces distinct four-group and three-group equilibria.
In the next section we look in more detail at parameter constellations where L- or
S-strategies are played and therefore three- or four-group equilibria occur.
155 L- versus S-Strategies
5.1 Graphic Examples
As we have shown in the previous section, there are situations where a four-group
equilibrium leads to a higher expected value for an agenda-setter than a three-group
equilibrium. To give an impression of the relation between the outcomes using the
L-strategies and the S-strategies, we provide some numerical examples in this section.
We choose α = 0.5 and δ ∈ {0.1,0.5,0.9} and plot V mL
a (xL) and V mS
a (xS). The size of
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Figure 1: α = 0.5, δ = 0.1
The graphs show that the four-group equilibrium with m < N−1
2 becomes more attrac-
tive the larger N is. The ﬁgures suggests the existence of a threshold ˆ N such that only
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Figure 3: α = 0.5, δ = 0.9
175.2 Calculations
The following tables illustrate results of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3. In the ﬁrst
(Table 1a) we describe the L-strategies and indicate in the last column whether a four-
group equilibrium occurs. In the second table (Table 1b) the S-strategies are described.
Now m is always smaller than αN − 1. The proposal consists of four groups: The
agenda-setter receiving xa = 1 − mM − (αN − 1 − m)T , the individuals who receive
M = δV m∗
a (x∗), the individuals who obtain T, and the other members who obtain zero.
In the last column we indicate whether the S-strategies occur in equilibrium. The
calculations are made for α = 0.75, δ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9} and N ∈ {5, 11, 101, 1001}.
Further tables are given in the appendix. Table 2a (2b) describes the L-strategies (S-
strategies) for α = 0.5 and δ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. Tables 3a and 3b delineate the L- and
S-strategies, respectively, for α = 0.9 and δ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. The last tables 4a (4b)
illustrate the L-strategies (S-strategies) for α = 1, i.e. when unanimity is required,
and δ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}.
Table 1a.
N α δ mL ML T L V mL
a (xL) xa 4-group-equil.
5 0.75 0.1 4 0.07 0.02 0.7 0.714
11 0.75 0.1 10 0.05 0.009 0.5 0.5
101 0.75 0.1 50 0.014 0.0005 0.14 0.28 X
1001 0.75 0.1 500 0.0019 0.00005 0.019 0.038 X
5 0.75 0.5 3 0.18 0.09 0.356 0.467
11 0.75 0.5 5 0.105 0.03 0.21 0.4 X
101 0.75 0.5 50 0.017 0.0033 0.034 0.066 X
1001 0.75 0.5 500 0.0018 0.00033 0.0037 0.007 X
5 0.75 0.9 2 0.23 0.16 0.26 0.42 X
11 0.75 0.9 5 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.23 X
101 0.75 0.9 50 0.015 0.008 0.017 0.03 X
1001 0.75 0.9 500 0.0016 0.0008 0.0018 0.003 X
18Table 1 b.
N α δ mS MS T S V mS
a (xS) xa V mS
a (xS) > V mL
a (xL)
5 0.75 0.1 1 0.024 0.0054 0.242 0.966
11 0.75 0.1 4 0.034 0.0039 0.34 0.85
101 0.75 0.1 32 0.016 0.00034 0.156 0.49 X
1001 0.75 0.1 99 0.005 0.000011 0.05 0.5 X
5 0.75 0.5 1 0.11 0.04 0.22 0.82
11 0.75 0.5 4 0.104 0.026 0.207 0.5
101 0.75 0.5 13 0.033 0.0011 0.066 0.5 X
1001 0.75 0.5 44 0.011 0.00004 0.022 0.49 X
5 0.75 0.9 1 0.19 0.14 0.21 0.57
11 0.75 0.9 4 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.28 X
101 0.75 0.9 9 0.035 0.0044 0.039 0.39 X
1001 0.75 0.9 29 0.013 0.0002 0.014 0.48 X
The tables conﬁrm the relationship derived in section 5.1 between L- and S-strategies
for α > 0.5. The strategy m = mS yields a higher expected payoﬀ for the agenda-
setter if N is suﬃciently large. The tables also illustrate examples where a four-group
equilibrium occurs with x∗ = xL, i.e. m∗ ≥ N−1
2 . One such parameter constellation is
given by δ = 0.5, α = 0.75 and N = 11.
Note that the share xa that the agenda-setter proposes for himself is much higher in
the proposal xS even if V mS
a (xS) < V mL
a (xL). This is because the probability of a
proposal being seconded and hence adopted is much smaller under S-strategies. The
higher risk of being rejected when using the S-strategies is compensated by a higher
payoﬀ if accepted.
6 Conclusion
We have examined the BF model of an open amendment rule, using the concept of
stationary equilibria. We have shown that the equilibrium consideration of BF need
to be amended, as the possibility of a four-group equilibrium has to be taken into
account. We have proved that there is a situation where the BF equilibrium is not an
equilibrium. Moreover, calculations indicate that a four-group equilibrium is always
19better if the number of individuals N is suﬃciently large.
Our results may have implications for two areas of research. First, the BF approach has
been applied to a wide variety of questions and has been investigated experimentally
(e.g. Frechette, Kagel, and Lehrer (2002)). Hence, as far as the role of open rules is
concerned, our results call for some qualiﬁcations. Second, the comparison between
closed and open rules in legislatures may be amended. On the one hand, the power of
the member recognized under an open rule may be still considerably high. On the other
hand, the costs of delay under open rules may be much higher, as the probability of a
proposal being accepted is lower than one half in four-group equilibrium with x∗ = xS.
207 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
We would like to calculate the continuation value of the agenda-setter. Note, that his
’real’ share of the cake, denoted by xa, is the left-over of the cake after paying other
individuals to move the proposal and / or to vote for his proposal against status quo,
i.e. the whole cake is distributed and xa = 1−mM −max{αN −1−m,0}T. We will
calculate the amounts M and T in a ﬁrst step.
• Calculation of M:
Let Va denote the continuation value of the agenda-setter. The amount needed
to bribe legislators to move the proposal is given by the discounted continuation
value of the agenda-setter. We obtain the condition
M ≥ δVa .
Since every agenda-setter a will maximize his own share xa we can assume equal-
ity.
• Calculation of T:
Using symmetry we have that conditional on acceptance in the next period the
continuation value for each individual is 1
N as every agenda-setter will propose to
distribute the whole cake and individuals are ex ante identical. The probability
that a proposal is accepted in a particular period is given by P[A] = m
N−1, if m is
the number of legislators that are bribed to move the proposal. The critical value
needed for an individual to vote for a proposal (against status quo) - without being
recognized as agenda-setter - is denoted by T and is equal to the continuation
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N[1 − δ(1 − P[A])]
=
δm
N[N − 1 − δ(N − 1 − m)]
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where VL denotes the continuation value of a member recognized next who is oﬀered
zero, e.i. a ’loser’. This covers the case where an amendment is made under which the
prior agenda-setter receives zero.












N−1 the proposal is moved and therefore accepted. With probability
1
N−1 the individual will be recognized as amendment-setter and with probability 1− m+1
N−1
an amendment is made by an other individual so that (using our tie-breaking rules)
the indvidual under consideration obtains M under the amendment, i.e. becomes a
’winner’.














Again, the proposal will be accepted with probability m
N−1 (which includes recognizing
the individual under consideration as amendment-setter). With probability 1 − m
N−1
an amendment will be made under which he may obtain 0, T or M. VS denotes the
continuation value in this case, i.e. of a ﬁrst proposal winner if an amendment is made.
The amendment-setter will oﬀer 2m − N + 2 of the prior proposal winners M again.
They are chosen randomly. If the equilibrial proposal is a four-group equilibrium the
amendment-setter will also choose randomly αN − m − 1 prior proposal winners to
obtain T under the amendment. All other ﬁrst proposal winners obtain zero. Note
that individuals who receive T act in the same way as individuals who obtain 0 in the






















N−1δVa + (1 − m+1
N−1)δVW
i
With this equation we can calculate Va (that depends on m) and then obtain
m
L(δ,α,N) = max{m ≥
N − 1
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Inserting VL into Va we can calculate the continuation value of the agenda-setter,



























































































Note that the sum of the shares in the equilibrium proposal is 1:
xa + mM + max{αN − 1 − m,0}T + min{(1 − α)N,N − 1 − m}0 = 1.
Proof of Proposition 3





N[N − 1 − δ(N − 1 − m)]








where VL is again the continuation value of an individual who receives zero in a proposal.











where VW denotes the continuation value of an individual who would have obtained 0
or T in the ﬁrst proposal and therefore receives M = δVa (with probability m
N−m−2) or
T or 0 (with probability 1− m
N−m−2) in an amendment, i.e. becomes a ’winner’. Recall
that pl = min{αN−1−m
N−2m−2,1} denotes the probability of an individual who would have
received T or 0 under the ﬁrst proposal obtaining T instead of 0 under an amendment.
With this notation we obtain
VW =
m
N − m − 2
h m
N − 1


























VS denotes the continuation value of an individual who was oﬀered M in the ﬁrst




















Recall that pk = 1−min{
(1−α)N
m ,1} denotes the probability of an individual who would
have received M under the ﬁrst proposal obtaining T under an amendment. With this



















































⇒ VW = D2
E · Va + D1
E · T
⇒ VL = 1
N−1δVa + (1 − m+1
N−1)δ D2










+ (1 − m+1
N−1)δ D1
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⇒ Va = m
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Proof of Proposition 4
The ﬁrst point is obvious. If we exogenously restrict m ≥ N−1
2 and use our tie-breaking
rules concerning the choice of amendments (that are in the spirit of BF), the resulting
equilibrium is equivalent to the theorem of BF. The three groups are the agenda-setter,
the individuals who receive zero, and the members who receive M.
26Without the restriction to m ≥ N−1
2 it is possible that the optimal strategy is to set
m∗ = mS, even if α = 0.5. This amends the theorem of Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
To prove the second point of Proposition 4, we show that the L-strategies do not form








Suppose that V mS
a (xS) > V mL
a (xL) for some N and δ. Despite the fact that the very ﬁrst
recognized agenda-setter is better oﬀ by proposing xS, we assume that the L-strategies
(i.e. BF strategies) are played but no proposal is accepted. The main question is if
the agenda-setter recognized next has an incentive to deviate from the BF strategy,
i.e. can he construct the four-group proposal with mS < N−1
2 such that it defeats the
prior proposal? Consider the following amendment:
The second agenda-setter oﬀers xS
a to himself, T S to N−1
2 −mS individuals who received
zero under the ﬁrst proposal (chosen randomly), zero to the ﬁrst agenda-setter, and
δV mS
a (xS) to mS < N−1
2 individuals who are again chosen randomly between the other
individuals. All other members receive no beneﬁts.
This proposal defeats the prior proposal since the amendment-setter and all individuals
who receive T S > 0 or MS = δV mS
a (xS) > ML will vote for the second proposal. As
we assumed that V mS
a (xS) > V mL
a (xL) = V mBF
a (xBF), the second agenda-setter has an
incentive to deviate from playing the L-strategyc.
For the last point of Proposition 4 we have to show that there exists a situation (given
by N ∈ N, α = 1
2 and δ ∈ [0,1]) such that V mS
1 (xS) > V mL
1 (xL). We give an example.
Set δ = 0.5 and N = 101. We obtain
V mL
a (xL) = 0.037 V mS
a (xS) = 0.068
xL
a = 0.07 xS
a = 0.48
mL = 50 mS = 14
ML = 0.019 MS = 0.034
T S = 0.0012
The expected value of the ﬁrst agenda-setter using the S-strategies is nearly twice as
high as under the L-strategies.
27Tables for α = 0.5.
Table 2a
N α δ mL ML T L V mL
a (xL) xa 4-group equil.
5 0.5 0.1 4 0.07 0.02 0.714 0.714
11 0.5 0.1 10 0.05 0.009 0.5 0.5
101 0.5 0.1 50 0.014 0.0005 0.143 0.285
1001 0.5 0.1 500 0.0019 0.000053 0.019 0.038
5 0.5 0.5 3 0.178 0.086 0.356 0.5
11 0.5 0.5 5 0.11 0.03 0.226 0.43
101 0.5 0.5 50 0.02 0.0033 0.037 0.07
1001 0.5 0.5 500 0.002 0.00033 0.004 0.0077
5 0.5 0.9 2 0.26 0.16 0.29 0.477
11 0.5 0.9 5 0.15 0.074 0.161 0.274
101 0.5 0.9 50 0.019 0.008 0.021 0.037
1001 0.5 0.9 500 0.002 0.0008 0.0022 0.0039
Table 2b.
N α δ mS MS T S V mS
a (xS) xa V mS
a (xS) > V mL
a (xL)
5 0.5 0.1 1 0.024 0.0055 0.244 0.97
11 0.5 0.1 4 0.034 0.004 0.344 0.86
101 0.5 0.1 32 0.016 0.00034 0.16 0.49 X
1001 0.5 0.1 100 0.005 0.000011 0.05 0.498 X
5 0.5 0.5 1 0.115 0.04 0.23 0.86
11 0.5 0.5 4 0.11 0.026 0.22 0.54
101 0.5 0.5 14 0.034 0.0012 0.068 0.48 X
1001 0.5 0.5 44 0.011 0.000042 0.022 0.498 X
5 0.5 0.9 1 0.23 0.14 0.26 0.7
11 0.5 0.9 4 0.15 0.07 0.17 0.35 X
101 0.5 0.9 10 0.04 0.005 0.045 0.41 X
1001 0.5 0.9 31 0.0135 0.00022 0.015 0.48 X
28Tables for α = 0.9.
Table 3a.
N α δ mL ML T L V mL
a (xL) xa 4-group-equil.
5 0.9 0.1 4 0.07 0.02 0.7 0.714
11 0.9 0.1 10 0.05 0.009 0.5 0.5
101 0.9 0.1 50 0.014 0.00052 0.14 0.28 X
1001 0.9 0.1 500 0.002 0.000053 0.019 0.038 X
5 0.9 0.5 3 0.17 0.086 0.34 0.45 X
11 0.9 0.5 5 0.1 0.03 0.2 0.38 X
101 0.9 0.5 50 0.016 0.0033 0.032 0.06 X
1001 0.9 0.5 500 0.0017 0.00033 0.0034 0.007 X
5 0.9 0.9 3 0.21 0.17 0.23 0.29 X
11 0.9 0.9 5 0.1 0.074 0.12 0.19 X
101 0.9 0.9 50 0.013 0.008 0.015 0.025 X
1001 0.9 0.9 500 0.0013 0.0008 0.0015 0.0025 X
Table 3b.
N α δ mS MS T S V mS
a (xS) xa V mS
a (xS) > V mL
a (xL)
5 0.9 0.1 1 0.024 0.0054 0.24 0.96
11 0.9 0.1 4 0.034 0.004 0.34 0.85
101 0.9 0.1 31 0.016 0.00033 0.16 0.5 X
1001 0.9 0.1 99 0.005 0.000011 0.05 0.5 X
5 0.9 0.5 1 0.1 0.04 0.2 0.79
11 0.9 0.5 4 0.1 0.036 0.2 0.48
101 0.9 0.5 13 0.032 0.0011 0.065 0.49 X
1001 0.9 0.5 43 0.011 0.00004 0.022 0.5 X
5 0.9 0.9 1 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.48
11 0.9 0.9 3 0.106 0.066 0.117 0.29
101 0.9 0.9 8 0.032 0.004 0.036 0.4 X
1001 0.9 0.9 28 0.012 0.0002 0.014 0.48 X
These tables give examples of equilibria with x∗ = xL that consist of four groups.
The equilibria are given by the parameter constellations α = 0.9, N ∈ {5,11}, and
δ ∈ {0.5,0.9}.
29Tables for α = 1.
Table 4a.
N α δ mL ML T L V mL
a (xL) xa 4-group-equil.
5 1 0.1 4 0.071 0.02 0.71 0.714
11 1 0.1 10 0.05 0.009 0.5 0.5
101 1 0.1 50 0.014 0.00052 0.139 0.278 X
1001 1 0.1 500 0.002 0.00005 0.02 0.037 X
5 1 0.5 4 0.167 0.1 0.33 0.33
11 1 0.5 5 0.096 0.03 0.19 0.37 X
101 1 0.5 50 0.016 0.0033 0.031 0.06 X
1001 1 0.9 500 0.0017 0.00033 0.0033 0.0064 X
5 1 0.9 4 0.196 0.18 0.22 0.217
11 1 0.9 5 0.09 0.074 0.1 0.167 X
101 1 0.9 50 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.02 X
1001 1 0.9 500 0.0012 0.0008 0.0013 0.0022 X
Table 4b.
N α δ mS MS T S V mS
a (xS) xa V mS
a (xS) > V mL
a (xL)
5 1 0.1 1 0.024 0.0054 0.24 0.96
11 1 0.1 4 0.034 0.004 0.337 0.84
101 1 0.1 31 0.015 0.00033 0.15 0.498 X
1001 1 0.1 99 0.005 0.000011 0.05 0.5 X
5 1 0.5 1 0.1 0.04 0.2 0.78
11 1 0.5 4 0.096 0.026 0.19 0.46
101 1 0.5 13 0.032 0.0011 0.064 0.49 X
1001 1 0.5 43 0.011 0.000041 0.0215 0.5 X
5 1 0.9 1 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.43
11 1 0.9 3 0.094 0.066 0.105 0.25 X
101 1 0.9 8 0.03 0.004 0.033 0.38 X
1001 1 0.9 28 0.012 0.0002 0.013 0.47 X
30References
Banks, J., and F. Gasmi (1987): “Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person
Committees,” Social Choice and Welfare, 4, 133–152.
Baron, D. P., and J. A. Ferejohn (1989): “Bargaining in Legislatures,” The
American Political Science Review, 83(4), 1181–1206.
Epple, D., and M. Riordan (1987): “Cooperation and Punishment under Repeated
Majority Voting,” Public Choice, 55, 41–73.
Ferejohn, J., M. Fiorina, and R. McKelvey (1987): “Sophisticated Voting and
Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting,” American Journal of
Political Science, 31, 169–193.
Frechette, G., J. Kagel, and S. Lehrer (2002): “Bargaining in Legislatures:
An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules,” Ohio,
Pennsylvania.
Harrington, J. E. (1986): “A noncooperative bargaining game with risk-averse
players and an uncertain ﬁnite horizon,” Economics Letters, 20, 9–13.
(1990): “The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a
proposal requires less than unanimous approval,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
3, 135–154.
Primo, D. (2007): “A comment on Baron and Ferejohn (1989): The open rule equi-
librium and coalition formation,” Public Choice, 130, 129–135.
31Working Papers of the Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich
(PDF-ﬁles of the Working Papers can be downloaded at www.cer.ethz.ch/research).
07/64 T. Fahrenberger and H. Gersbach
Legislative Process with Open Rules
07/63 U. von Arx and A. Sch¨ afer
The Inﬂuence of Pension Funds on Corporate Governance
07/62 H. Gersbach
The Global Refunding System and Climate Change
06/61 C. N. Brunnschweiler and E. H. Bulte
The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of Paradoxes and Red Herrings
06/60 R. Winkler
Now or Never: Environmental Protection under Hyperbolic Discounting
06/59 U. Brandt-Pollmann, R. Winkler, S. Sager, U. Moslener and J.P. Schl¨ oder
Numerical Solution of Optimal Control Problems with Constant Control Delays
06/58 F. M¨ uhe
Vote Buying and the Education of a Society
06/57 C. Bell and H. Gersbach
Growth and Enduring Epidemic Diseases
06/56 H. Gersbach and M. M¨ uller
Elections, Contracts and Markets
06/55 S. Valente
Intergenerational Transfers, Lifetime Welfare and Resource Preservation
06/54 H. Fehr-Duda, M. Sch¨ urer and R. Schubert
What Determines the Shape of the Probability Weighting Function?
06/53 S. Valente
Trade, Envy and Growth: International Status Seeking in a Two-Country World
06/52 K. Pittel
A Kuznets Curve for Recycling
06/51 C. N. Brunnschweiler
Cursing the blessings? Natural resource abundance, institutions, and economic
growth
06/50 C. Di Maria and S. Valente
The Direction of Technical Change in Capital-Resource Economics
06/49 C. N. Brunnschweiler
Financing the alternative: renewable energy in developing and transition countries06/48 S. Valente
Notes on Habit Formation and Socially Optimal Growth
06/47 L. Bretschger
Energy Prices, Growth, and the Channels in Between: Theory and Evidence
06/46 M. Schularick and T.M. Steger
Does Financial Integration Spur Economic Growth? New Evidence from the First
Era of Financial Globalization
05/45 U. von Arx
Principle guided investing: The use of negative screens and its implications for green
investors
05/44 Ch. Bjørnskov, A. Dreher and J.A.V. Fischer
The bigger the better? Evidence of the eﬀect of government size on life satisfaction
around the world
05/43 L. Bretschger
Taxes, Mobile Capital, and Economic Dynamics in a Globalising World
05/42 S. Smulders, L. Bretschger and H. Egli
Economic Growth and the Diﬀusion of Clean Technologies: Explaining Environmen-
tal Kuznets Curves
05/41 S. Valente
Tax Policy and Human Capital Formation with Public Investment in Education
05/40 T.M. Steger and L. Bretschger
Globalization, the Volatility of Intermediate Goods Prices and Economic Growth
05/39 H. Egli
A New Approach to Pollution Modelling in Models of the Environmental Kuznets
Curve
05/38 S. Valente
Genuine Dissaving and Optimal Growth
05/37 K. Pittel, J.-P. Amigues and T. Kuhn, Endogenous Growth and Recycling: A Ma-
terial Balance Approach
05/36 L. Bretschger and K. Pittel
Innovative investments, natural resources, and intergenerational fairness: Are pen-
sion funds good for sustainable development?
04/35 T. Trimborn, K.-J. Koch and T.M. Steger
Multi-Dimensional Transitional Dynamics: A Simple Numerical Procedure
04/34 K. Pittel and D.T.G. R¨ ubbelke
Private Provision of Public Goods: Incentives for Donations
04/33 H. Egli and T.M. Steger
A Simple Dynamic Model of the Environmental Kuznets Curve04/32 L. Bretschger and T.M. Steger
The Dynamics of Economic Integration: Theory and Policy
04/31 H. Fehr-Duda, M. de Gennaro, R. Schubert
Gender, Financial Risk, and Probability Weights
03/30 T.M. Steger
Economic Growth and Sectoral Change under Resource Reallocation Costs
03/29 L. Bretschger
Natural resource scarcity and long-run development: central mechanisms when con-
ditions are seemingly unfavourable
03/28 H. Egli
The Environmental Kuznets Curve - Evidence from Time Series Data for Germany
03/27 L. Bretschger
Economics of technological change and the natural environment: how eﬀective are
innovations as a remedy for resource scarcity?
03/26 L. Bretschger, S. Smulders
Sustainability and substitution of exhaustible natural resources. How resource prices
aﬀect long-term R&D-investments
03/25 T.M. Steger
On the Mechanics of Economic Convergence
03/24 L. Bretschger
Growth in a Globalised Economy: The Eﬀects of Capital Taxes and Tax Competition
02/23 M. Gysler, J.Kruse and R. Schubert
Ambiguity and Gender Diﬀerences in Financial Decision Making: An Experimental
Examination of Competence and Conﬁdence Eﬀects
01/22 S. Rutz
Minimum Participation Rules and the Eﬀectiveness of Multilateral Environmental
Agreements
01/21 M. Gysler, M. Powell, R. Schubert
How to Predict Gender-Diﬀerences in Choice Under Risk: A Case for the Use of
Formalized Models
00/20 S.Rutz, T. Borek
International Environmental Negotiation: Does Coalition Size Matter?
00/19 S. Dietz
Does an environmental Kuznets curve exist for biodiversity?